

Schwerpunkt: Contested Public Organizations

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No Strategic Fit in Peacebuilding Policy Implementation?

German and EU Assistance with Police Reform in Afghanistan

Abstract

Focusing on German and EU support with assisting local police reform in the context of international peacebuilding in Afghanistan since 2001, this article scrutinizes whether the two organizations exhibit a strategic fit between their policy mandate and the design of management tasks. Comparison of two vastly different institutions —Germany, a nation state, and the EU, an international organization—sheds analytical light on the way different bodies manage a similar policy problem. By way of empirical research, the paper finds that incremental planning, decentralization and autonomous leadership enhance performance as they enable peacebuilders to respond flexibly to the dynamic challenges they face in the field. This was the case with Germany, however not with the EU. No strategic fit prevailed on evaluation. Strategy review either failed (Germany) or had unintended consequences (EU).

Key words: Police reform, strategic management, bureaucracy, international organization, Afghanistan

Zusammenfassung

Kein „strategischer Fit“ bei der Implementation von Peacebuilding Policy? Die deutsche und EU Unterstützung bei der Polizeireform in Afghanistan

Forschung zum strategischen Management postuliert, dass Organisationen, bei denen eine Anpassung von Managementfunktionen an Politikaufgaben stattfindet, erfolgreicher sind als andere. Im Fokus dieser Analyse steht die Frage, ob es einen solchen „strategischen Fit“ bei der deutschen und EU Unterstützung von Polizeireform in Afghanistan seit 2001 gegeben hat. Der Beitrag analysiert wie zwei institutionell hochgradig unterschiedliche Akteure – Deutschland, ein Nationalstaat, und die EU, eine supranationale Organisation – mit einem ähnlichen Politikproblem umgehen. Als Ergebnis wird festgestellt, dass inkrementelle Planung, Dezentralisierung und autonome Führung die Performanz erhöhen, da Experten dadurch in der Lage sind, flexibel auf dynamische Entwicklungen vor Ort zu reagieren. Dies war bei Deutschland der Fall, nicht aber bei der EU. Keinen „strategischen Fit“ gab es dagegen im Bereich der Politikevaluation. Entweder Strategieanpassungen fanden nicht statt (Deutschland) oder Evaluationen führten zu nicht beabsichtigte Konsequenzen (EU).

Schlagworte: Polizeireform, Verwaltung, strategisches Management, internationale Organisationen, Afghanistan

Introduction¹

The idea of strategic public management is that agencies perform better if they achieve a fit between policy objectives and the design of their management tasks (*Ansoff* 1956;,

(Chandler 1962; Mintzberg 1978) Although there is a wealth of studies on management practices in public organizations, a daunting research gap remains on the crunch question of exactly which management methods reflect a “strategic fit” for dealing with a particular policy problem. Or can such a fit be achieved at all? As *Poister et al.* (2010, p. 540) conclude in their literature review on public agency strategic planning and management, “the knowledge deficit is so large that it is difficult to envision recommending too much research in this area.” In particular, there is limited research on the management of highly complex, so-called ‘wicked’ policy problems (*Rittel/Webber* 1973, see also *Danken et al.*, this issue, for a state of the art overview).

In order to contribute to our understanding of management designs based on which public administrations deal with complex policy problems, the present article studies the implementation of external assistance to police reform in Afghanistan after the US-led intervention in 2001. Comparison of two vastly different bodies – Germany, a nation state, and the EU, an international organization – sheds analytical light on the way actors with different institutional settings manage a similar policy problem.

The argument proceeds as follows. I first discuss a range of potential institutional configurations with respect to three management tasks central to policy implementation: planning, organization and leadership, and review. Second, for each of these management tasks, I introduce performance indicators. They serve as a baseline for comparison and to assess whether any of the two actors demonstrates good performance and converges to form something of a “strategic fit”. In a nutshell, the article finds that dealing with a wicked problem such as external assistance to police reform requires flexibility. Incremental planning, decentralization and autonomous leadership seem to be of advantage, but conflict with the need to install review instruments that ensure political control and strategy adjustments. In Germany, the civil service was unable to raise political attention when the reform project threatened to fail. In the EU, member states consistently misappropriate review instruments to suit their (geo-) political interests, thereby undermining police reform objectives.

Identifying the parameters constituting a “strategic fit” is relevant for the bureaucracies studied here. Although for some of them, such as the German Ministry of the Interior, police support is but a minor and extraordinary task compared to their routine work. But others are more specialized. The EU maintains a structure devoted exclusively to implementing the Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy. Similarly, the German Foreign Office recently undertook a major review exercise (Review 2014) to better adjust to new foreign policy objectives such as crisis management and peacebuilding. Inter alia, a new department for crisis prevention, stabilization and conflict management was installed in March 2015.² These developments demonstrate the practical relevance of studying the “strategic fit” in policy implementation.

A Strategic Fit in Peacebuilding?

Police reform in post-conflict societies often takes place in the context of peacebuilding operations. This recognizes that public stability and safety is among the most important conditions for development and peace (*World Bank* 2011). Peacebuilding takes place in complex, dangerous and challenging environments. As with many other wicked policy

problems, there is no monolithic truth or theory; scholars and practitioners “know relatively little about how to transform war-torn countries into stable societies” (*Paris/Sisk* 2009, p. 58). Unsurprisingly, the record of many peacebuilding interventions in recent years is mixed at best (*Call/Cousens* 2008). This puts peacebuilders under severe pressure to improve their methods and operations. Strategic management is one of the tools they use to do so. There is a widespread assumption that “good management can sometimes mean the difference between success and failure” (*IPi* 2012, p. 1).

This public management turn in international peacebuilding naturally sparked scholarly attention. For a decade now, scholars have been unpacking the bureaucratic structures and processes (including management) of international organizations (*Barnett/Finnemore* 1999, 2004; for an overview see *Ege/Bauer* 2013). More specifically, the relationship between member states and peacebuilding bureaucrats has been a recurring topic (*Dijkstra* 2013, 2015), as have been organizational learning processes (*Benner/Eckhard/Rotmann* 2013) and the allocation of managerial discretion between field-level and headquarter bureaucracy (*Breakey/Dekker* 2014; *Karlsrud* 2013). However, there is still a genuine lack of empirical evidence on how different management designs affect mission performance and, eventually, peacebuilding outcomes (*Allen/Yuen* 2014).

This question is the core concern of strategic management research. In business research, “the principle of strategic ‘fit’ considers the degree of alignment that exists between competitive situation, strategy, organization culture and leadership style” (*Chorn* 1991, p. 20). Accordingly, aligning organizational resources and capabilities with the demands of the policy task theoretically should enhance “the entire set of managerial decisions and actions that determine the long-run performance of an organization” (*Koteen* 1989, p. 18; cf. *Nutt/Backoff* 1992; *Poister/Pitts/Hamilton* 2010). Strategy, on the one hand, refers to a chain of intermediate steps to reach a goal (*Mintzberg* 1978). Management, on the other, has been defined as “working with human, financial, and physical resources to determine, interpret, and achieve organizational objectives” (*Meggison/Mosley/Pietri* 1989, p. 5). In combination, strategic management is about achieving a fit between an organization’s strategy and its management functions. This is captured by *Chandler’s* (1962) seminal hypothesis “structure follows strategy”.

Independent Variables: Variation in Management Tasks

Studying the alignment of organizational resources and capabilities with the policy task (strategic fit) begins with the question of which tasks or dimensions of public management to look at. *Bogumil and Jann* (2006, p. 30) distinguish the three “classical” management tasks of public agencies: planning, organization and leadership, and review.³ Which kind of institutional configuration constitutes a “strategic fit” is subject to fierce academic debate and also dependent on the specific policy and operational context.

Strategic planning: Business sector research on strategic planning found that companies that engaged in planning were more successful than their competitors in the longer run (*Andrews* 1980; *Glueck* 1980). Despite these findings, there was a heated debate in the public sector as to whether these findings applied to public policy and bureaucracies as well (*Wildavsky* 1979). Most prominently, *Lindblom* (1959) argued that due to the complexity of the social world, the planning of public policy implementation does not lead to successful goal attainment. Instead, public organizations should “muddle through”

on the basis of incrementally adjusted short-term goals. Proponents of the alternative strategic planning perspective (sometimes called “synoptic”) argue that goals can be reached best if based on a purposeful triangulation between objectives, resources and the environment (*Raschke/Tils* 2007, 2010).

Organization and leadership: Among the most important structural feature of public administration is the number of hierarchical layers in an organization and the allocation of decision-making competencies at these levels. *Matland* (1995) argued that agencies should be designed depending on the (technological) ambiguity and (political) conflict inherent to the policy they implement. High conflict/high ambiguity policies (called symbolic) are dependent on the character of local actor coalitions and thus prone to bottom-up style implementation. Peacebuilding and police reform are such symbolic policies. In line with this, *Karlsrud* (2013, p. 539) claims that “there is need for considerable leeway for senior leaders in the field” and cautions “against a too fine-grained and detailed normative framework that limits the freedom of action of special representatives and envoys”.

Strategy review: Organizations use evaluations and similar tools to assess the impact, effectiveness, and efficiency of programs or policies (*Clarke/Dawson* 1999). In public organizations, the bureaucracy alone usually lacks the power and means to initiate major policy changes. Review processes bring in political decision-makers. The extent to which they are involved is determined by the organizational level at which review processes are allocated (headquarters vs. field). The standard model of evaluation assumes that policy or strategy adjustments will be made in case review reports detect a severe deviation between strategy and outcome (*Stufflebeam/Shinkfield* 2007). Public administration research is more pessimistic about this, arguing that “the needs of the organization and the people within it conflict with the desire to continuously monitor activities and change policies when they are found wanting” (*Wildavsky* 1972, p. 509). Irrespective of this, peacebuilding literature so far only echoes the need for more and better evaluation to facilitate learning and policy adjustment (*Meharg* 2009; *Paffenholz/Reychler* 2007).

Dependent Variable: The Concept of Process Performance

Studying the “strategic fit” in peacebuilding policy implementation implies asking how variation in the above management tasks affects peace operations’ ability to reach policy objectives. This is of course a challenging endeavor that involves a long and complex causal process. Instead of tracing the entire causal chain between administrative action and policy results, analysts found it useful to focus on administrative performance (*J. Gao* 2015; *Kuhlmann* 2010). Earlier research mostly measured performance at the level of outputs, such as the number of regulations written or college students’ test scores (e.g., *Ebinger* 2013; *Meier/O’Toole/Boyne/Walker* 2007). In peacebuilding, however, such quantifiable indicators are frequently not available (how to measure good diplomacy?). And even in cases where they are, indicators such as the number of trained police officers could still be affected by the operative context (such as the safety to work).

In response to this challenge, *Gutner and Thompson* (2010) suggest assessing public agencies at the level of processes (internal decision-making, management) as a third option. They argue that the three layers of processes, outputs and outcomes are causally linked, with good performance “trickling-up” from processes to outcomes. As a result, performance indicators at each level should work as a proxy for the next higher level.

This is not to say that process performance can explain outcomes. There is still the problem of external factors that have to be accounted for: “At best, process performance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for favorable outcomes” (ibid., p. 236).

To measures peace operations’ performance at the level of processes, a review of peacebuilding literature yields indicators for good process performance for the management functions introduced earlier (see Table 1). First, because timing in peacebuilding is critical, planning processes should not be an end in itself, but allow triangulating aims, resources and strategies in order to foster rapid launch of operations (*IPI* 2012; *Mintzberg* 1978). Second, peace operations are characterized by rapidly shifting political dynamics on the ground and the need to collaborate with diverse actors. Structures should thus enable mission leadership to be adoptable and flexible during implementation (*Karlsrud* 2013; *Schori* 2009). Third, in terms of closing the policy cycle, it is highly relevant for long-term success that peacebuilders have instruments in place that provide linkages to their political principals and enable them to shift a strategy they find wanting (*Meharg* 2009; *Paffenholz/Reychler* 2007).

Table 1: Indicators for Process Performance in Peacebuilding (own compilation)

Management Task	Process Performance Indicator	Peacebuilding Literature
Planning	Is the mission able to launch operations quickly after the mandate gets passed?	De Coning (2009), IPI (2012), Paffenholz & Reychler (2007).
Organization and Leadership	Is mission leadership able to coordinate its activities with key partners on the ground and adjust flexibly to their short-term preferences?	IPI (2012), Jones (2002), Schori (2009); Karlsrud (2013).
Review	Is the mission able to adjust its strategy in case it lacks impact?	Meharg (2009), Paffenholz & Reychler (2007).

Method and Case Selection: Germany and the EU in Police Reform in Afghanistan

The paper achieves a mixture of comparison and process tracing. First, tracing causal processes (or mechanisms) refers to examining “by what intermediate steps, a certain outcome follows from a set of initial conditions” (*Mayntz* 2004, p. 241). Process tracing “invokes a (...) complex logic, one analogous to detective work, legal briefs, journalism, and traditional historical accounts. The analyst seeks to make sense of a congeries of disparate evidence, each of which sheds light on a single outcome or set of related outcomes” (*Gerring* 2007, p. 178). In this case, the paper traces the processes by which institutional designs affect agency performance.

Second, the article compares the performance of external support to police reform by the German police reform office (2001-2006) with the performance of the EU’s police reform mission (EUPOL, since 2007). It is important to note that the two cases are historically consecutive and thus not independent from one another. There was a general deterioration in the security situation in Afghanistan over time. While the German project operated in an initially largely secure environment, the EU mission faced severe security threats upfront. In addition, it arrived at a time when the US initiated a larger strategic

shift towards a phase of military counterinsurgency operations that also limited the space for civilian peacebuilding. Nonetheless, both Germany and the EU can be assessed with respect to the pace of their planning, their ability to coordinate with key local actors, and whether they reviewed and adjusted their implementation strategy.

The data reported in this paper are part of a larger study on police reform in Afghanistan and Kosovo (Eckhard 2016). Main data sources for this paper are policy documents and 64 expert interviews conducted in Kabul, Berlin and Brussels between 2011 and 2013. Due to the political sensitivity of matters related to the performance of peace operations, interviewees were given pseudonyms.⁴ Respondents were selected to represent different organizational perspectives (see Table 2); each answered semi-structured questions regarding how they perceived an organization's performance in terms of three management tasks and which factors were particularly relevant for this assessment. The author substantiated these statements by linking them to observable empirical processes in the two missions. In so doing, the paper drills right into the causal processes that link peacebuilding policy with peacebuilding outcomes: The actions taking place within the peacebuilding bureaucracy.

Table 2: Overview of Interviews Conducted for the Afghanistan Study

Place	Date of Field Trip	# Interviews			
		Police	Project	Admin	External
Afghanistan: Kabul	Jun 2011, Feb 2012	5	10	4	9
Germany: Berlin, other	Several between 2011 and 2013	3	10	3	0
Belgium: Brussels (EU)	Jul 2011, Apr 2012	0	10	6	4

German Assistance to Police Reform in Afghanistan (2001-2006)

Peacebuilding in Afghanistan started out with what became known as the 'light footprint' approach (*UN Secretary-General* 2002, p. 6). On 27 November 2001, while fighting in Afghanistan was still ongoing, representatives from four Afghan groups met in the German city of Bonn for a peace conference. The resulting agreement provided no ground for a powerful United Nations peacebuilding mission such as in Kosovo or East Timor. Instead, it left the Afghans with the responsibility of organizing the reconstruction of their country. The international community deployed a small international security force. To rebuild the country, the Tokyo reconstruction conference in January 2002 opted to rely on the classical instruments of international aid while assigning lead nation tasks. At Bonn, Afghan representatives had asked Germany to take a leading role in police assistance. Other countries such as the United States (military reform), Britain (fighting drugs) and Italy (justice reform) also took on such lead nation responsibilities.

Planning for the German police reform office in Afghanistan took place in a non-formalized and incremental process that was determined by the (limited) budget available. In January 2002, the UN Development Program had published an assessment suggesting an Afghan police force of 30,000 that would cost 320 million US dollars (*UNDP* 2002). The German parliament pledged 80 million euros per year for Afghan reconstruction.⁵ Without much consideration of the actual tasks at hand, senior representatives of the

German Ministry of Development and the Foreign Office jostled about these funds. The Foreign Office, which should coordinate German assistance with police reform, eventually earmarked 12 million euros for the project out of its own 30 million euro share. Up until this point, operational considerations played a very limited role, if at all (Interviews No. 1, 2, 18, 21, 26). In April 2002, after a series of delegation visits to Kabul and reform conferences in Berlin, the German police presented a police reform strategy, modelled along Afghan preferences. The idea was to run only a small training program for higher police ranks while serving as the “lead nation” coordinating the contributions of other donors, specifically a planned US training program for over 30,000 patrolmen (*BMI* 2002). The program was to be implemented by only 14 German police officers who arrived in Kabul within only a few days.⁶ Although German planning was flexible enough to adjust to Afghan preferences, this reform strategy was also the only plausible course of action given the previously defined financial resources.

As during the planning phase, Berlin provided its police reform office with much leeway. Political attention was minimal. The German parliament has no formal right of appeal on these police-related decisions. Unlike the deployment of the German military abroad, it must only be informed about the government’s decision to deploy police officers abroad.⁷ In line with the German principle of ministerial responsibility (*Ressortprinzip*), the Ministry of Interior and the Foreign Office oversaw the project autonomously. On the ground, as both German and Afghan interviewees testified, the fourteen Kabul-based police officers and their colleagues at the embassy (the Foreign Office nominated a special ambassador for police reform) were quite successful at first. Although short on staff and funds, they refurbished Kabul’s police academy and helped to set up a three-year training program for the top-level of Afghanistan’s new police. Alongside these efforts, the German development agency (GIZ) installed an implementation unit devoted to supporting German police reform efforts by commissioning refurbishing contracts or conducting human rights training classes (Interviews No. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).

With the German police project’s limitation in its own financial resources, the bulk of training and equipment deliveries had to be provided by partners. Coordinating these third-country contributions was the task of the Foreign Office. In its attempts to do so, it organized a set of fund-raising conferences. However, they were soon forced to learn that the US, which had commissioned a multi-million-dollar training project to a private sector contractor, had little interest in being coordinated by German diplomats and police officers. In addition to being outmatched in resources, German officials also faced a much stricter staff security policy that occasionally even prevented them from visiting training premises (Interviews No. 18, 19). If at all, donors thus coordinated negatively i.e., by filling regional or functional gaps without referring to an overall German reform strategy.

Providing a snapshot of police reform achievements, a report by the US Department of Defense and the State Department stated that, by 2007, none of the police units trained by Germany and the US was fully capable of performing its duties: 3 percent were capable with coalition support, 4 percent were partially capable, 77 percent were not capable at all, and 16 percent were not communicating with Kabul (GAO, 2008, p. 32). For US officials, this was clearly the fault of Germany’s under-resourced assistance strategy, as one US army general wrote in an evaluation: “We are starting from ground zero. The Germans who have lead nation responsibility have not been much help” (McCaffrey, 2006, p. 7). German officials agreed that their resources were insufficient. But they also claimed that Germany never had consented to pay the entire bill but that other partners

should also contribute. They pointed to the unwillingness of the US to be coordinated as a main reason for the shortcomings of early police reform in Afghanistan (Interview 18, 19, 20).

Despite early warning signs and criticism foretelling a potential failure of the German reform strategy (*Von Hammerstein/Hoyng/Schlamp/Szandar* 2006), Germany's police reform budget remained constant with 12 million euros a year until 2007. Other donors, specifically the US, increased their financial commitment significantly (*GAO* 2009, p. 4). As interviewees recalled, a lack of monitoring or review instruments was not the problem. German officials at the working and ministerial level in Kabul and Berlin were well aware that the German police reform strategy was about to fail (Interviews No. 18, 20, 22, 23, 24). All ministries received weekly and monthly reports and status updates. In 2006, the German Foreign Office even acknowledged publicly that efforts were insufficient and pointed to a lack of staff and money as the main reasons (*Auswärtiges Amt* 2006). However, the bureaucracy's potential to counter-steer was limited. The threshold was a government cabinet decision to significantly increase police deployments or a parliamentary decision to increase the budget. But Berlin's political class, ministers, and members of parliament were simply not interested in politically supporting the Afghanistan police reform dossier (Interviews No. 14, 19, 20; see also *Nachtwei* 2013). The government's agenda changed only a few years later, after critical media reporting increasingly featured Germany's failing Afghanistan policy. Responding to the political costs associated with a potential failure in Afghanistan, in 2009 the government increased the Foreign Office's annual Afghanistan budget from the initial 30 Mio Euro to 121.2 Mio Euro and even further to 190 Mio Euro in 2010 (see Bundestag, 2012, p. 4ff). Without such support and resources in 2006, the Foreign Office saw two options remaining. The first, international fund-raising at police reform conferences in Berlin and Doha in 2004 and 2006, didn't bring the desired results. As the second countermeasure within their scope, German diplomats turned to the EU in the rightful hope that a joint EU effort would have more impact (Interview No. 18, 19, 20).

The EU Police Reform Mission in Afghanistan (since 2007)

Not all of the major governments engaged in Afghanistan welcomed the German plans for an EU police mission. Both the US (preferred broader NATO engagement) (*US Government* 09 November 2006) and France (preferred EU mission's in Africa over Central Asia) (Interviews No. 14, 15, 22) lobbied against this strategy. But with Italy and Britain also interested in putting the lead nation strategy to rest, German pressure kicked off formal planning procedures (Interviews No. 15, 20, 22). In May 2007, using its position as then president of the Council, Germany got the other EU member states to agree to launch EUPOL, based on the minimal consensus that Germany would provide the bulk of the 200 mandated police officers (*EU Council* 2007a). However, it took the mission over one year to become operational. On the one hand, the security situation was worsening dramatically, limiting freedom of movement even in Kabul. Second, the EU's bureaucratic requirements for acquiring office facilities, tendering equipment and recruiting staff are highly complex, adversely affecting the need for fast deployment. By the time the mission finally launched operational activities, the environment had changed fundamentally. The US, which had never demonstrated much faith in the EU, successfully lobbied for an ad-

ditional training mission. Run by NATO, that mission arrived in 2009 with around 2,800 trainers and a largely overlapping mandate (*NTM-A* 2010). The two missions tried to negotiate a new division of labor, but the process became extremely protracted because EUPOL's head of mission had to consult Brussels for even minor decisions.⁸ It took EUPOL another year to define the niche in which to pursue its own police reform vision. By that time, however, most partners had lost faith in what they denounced as a "half-hearted and poorly planned adventure" (*US Government* 12 July 2007) (Interviews No. 8, 10, 11, 12, 13).

EU missions have no legal personality. They exist only in the form of a special advisor contract between the head of mission and the EU Commission, which oversees the Union's budget implementation. The head of mission is liable for budget spending in accordance with the EU's rules of procedure. Regardless of their budget liability, however, the head of mission's operative freedom is extremely limited. The EU's planning documents, the concept of operations and the operational plan determine missions' exact shape and tasks. In addition, the EU Council has the right to "exercise (...) political control and strategic direction" (*EU Council* 2007b, Art. 10). This leaves the mission with minimal room to maneuver within the boundaries defined by the mandate. As soon as EUPOL activities touched upon matters not foreseen by the operational plan, the EU Council had to be consulted. Although a Council working level body met almost daily to deal with such issues, decision-making on the matter related to EUPOL was extremely slow. As one EUPOL manager complained in 2010: "Often you would put papers in very quickly; it would take weeks if not months, and sometimes you would get no reply at all and you have lost the moment then."⁹

Cooperation is one of the areas that suffer most from this. An EU mission's main asset is the expertise of professional police officers who train and mentor their local counterparts. Missions at the time had no additional budget to build or refurbish police stations, or to provide uniforms or other equipment. For EUPOL, cooperation with partners, therefore, was key to success. One obvious candidate for cooperation was the EU Commission's Department for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO), which maintained its own office in Kabul. As one of the first collaborative projects, EUPOL responded to Afghan requests for a new police staff college and a new faculty building for criminal investigations training. In spring 2010, DEVCO staff drafted an information fiche (planning document), which was approved and budgeted by Brussels.¹⁰ But because training at these faculties had not been part of EUPOL's original operational plan, the EU Council had to be consulted. After four meetings with EUPOL staff and ten hours of discussion, member states decided to approve the staff college, but vetoed the faculty building for non-apparent reasons (Interview No. 9, 16). DEVCO subsequently adjusted its plans, published a tender, and signed a contract with the Afghan government on October 18, 2011. Construction works kicked off in June 2012 – two years after the project idea and four years after EUPOL's deployment.¹¹ In a post-conflict context, such a delay is clearly too long. This is just one example demonstrating how protected decision-making thwarted EUPOL operations.

Compared to the German police office, insufficient political interest was not a problem EUPOL suffered from. However, two professional rationales frequently clashed in the EU's headquarters. The example of the annual strategic review illustrates the problem. In December 2011, Brussels sent an expert team to conduct interviews in Kabul and report back to the EU Council on how the mission performed in implementing its mandate.

They issued a list of recommendations on how to adjust the operational plan. This report, which was also shared with member states, went through several iterations of redrafting and refinement before being approved. As two officials recalled, eventual adjustments had little relationship to the original recommendations (Interviews No. 8, 17). It is hard to come by the details of these changes and the motives behind them. At least in the 2012 review, as one diplomat explained, France used its veto on EUPOL to reach approval for a new EU training mission in Mali – a mission that some states didn't want to see (Interviews No. 16, 25). Other respondents in Brussels confirmed more generally that member states often use their veto power vis-à-vis one mission as a bargaining chip in negotiations for different dossiers (Interviews No. 14, 15, 16). The result is political decisions that appear erratic and arbitrary to mission staff and are, at times, actually obstructive (as with the above example of the criminal training faculty building). As one interviewee summarized:

“Progress report and strategy proposals will be discussed in [the EU Council] and unanimous decision is needed. (...) Keeping in mind many European big countries have also their own bilateral projects and agendas with Afghanistan the discussion and management process is time after time pretty complicated, slowly and compromised.” (Interview 27)

Comparison: The Link between the Design of Management Tasks and Performance

This paper seeks to assess whether a strategic fit exists between the institutional designs of two organizations and their task of assisting local police reform in Afghanistan. As a first step, the last section reported on the two organizations' process performance in planning, organization and leadership, and review. This section analyses how these six observations of process performance relate to the institutional designs of the two organizations (see Figure 2 below).

First, in peacebuilding, if aid takes too long to manifest itself, local partners lose trust and the political momentum for change runs dry. Because of this, the first indicator for good performance asked whether peacebuilders were quick to get their boots on the ground (*de Coning* 2009; *IPI* 2012; *Paffenholz/Reychler* 2007). The two missions reveal significant differences in planning procedures. The EU runs on the basis of a highly centralized framework. The Germany-led case was more informal and incremental. Once the budget parameters had been defined, German officials were free to engage in operational planning within these limits. In terms of performance, respondents praised the flexibility of the German project (Interview 2, 18, 19, 20), but criticized the EU's supine performance. Most importantly, the EU's centralized planning procedures were unable to live up to the complex arrangements that had to be struck with partners in the field – both locals and other donors. Inter alia, EUPOL Afghanistan needed to re-plan after deployment as a result – which cost time and sympathy. As one interviewee claimed:

“From the mission point of view, there have been a lot of discussions about ‘micromanagement’. In some cases, the control was a bit too tight and the former Head of Missions found it difficult, perhaps they did not have enough latitude to manage and guide the mission in a way which should have adapted into the situation which is definitely decisive in the very challenging Afghan environment” (Interview 27).

At the same time, however, it is important to note that while the small German project implied limited logistics, EUPOL had to acquire offices and equipment for a mission with a staff of 400 – without being able at the time to revert to a central storage facility. None of the two actors exhibited what we might call a “strategic fit”. German planning came with a budget decision that was taken independently of the task. And the EU would have benefited from a more incremental approach that dealt with logistical questions first and was flexible in its strategy.

Second, peace operations require constant cooperation and flexibility to adjust to partners’ changing preferences. This can be achieved best by decentralized, informal, and autonomous subsystems. Again, the EU mission differed from its bilateral counterpart. Both in financial and operational terms, Brussels is part of the daily management of EU police reform. Mission staff must seek headquarter approval whenever unforeseen operative developments arise. And this is frequently the case. Because 28 member states consult on such questions, decisions take a long time. On the ground, time is always critical and most decisions need to be taken immediately. EUPOL therefore soon got a reputation as being slow and unreliable, something respondents linked coherently to the EU’s centralized structures (Interview 14, 15, 16, 27). By contrast, the German police project office reflected fully upon the ideal of the autonomous subsystem. Interviewees repeatedly said that management structures and financial regulations provided no obstacle to operations (Interview No. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). This supported previous claims that peacebuilding leadership should receive substantial operational autonomy.

Third, it must be doubted that structural detachment from Berlin was the only reason for the lack of strategy adjustments in the German police reform assistance strategy. All necessary reporting procedures were in place and interviewees confirmed that the ministries and the chancellery were well informed. Instead, the decisive issue seems to be one of political cost. This is demonstrated by the fact that German resource allocation to Afghanistan did change at last, albeit long after EUPOL came in. This happened not as a result of bureaucratic review findings but due to increasing public attention that began to threaten the government’s domestic politics. In addition to providing more financial resources, political pressure from the federal cabinet also managed to achieve what half a decade of working-level negotiations between the Foreign Office and the Ministry had not: a significant increase in the number of actual German police officers to be deployed in Afghanistan. The numbers went from 40 staff serving in 2007 to up to 200 police officers serving in 2010.¹² However, the change was effected only when support from the highest political echelons rose above the inertia inherent in the Ministry of the Interior’s bureaucracy.¹³

The threshold for strategy adjustments is much higher in the EU, where 27 (now 28) member states need to agree. In addition, even if adjustments are unnecessary, the strategic review process provides member states with the opportunity to veto the extension of a mission mandate. Review processes provide valuable assessment, but they also give way for politicization. As the above discussion indicates, member states attempt to manipulate review processes either to confirm their pre-existing policy positions or to influence negotiations on different policy dossiers by using their veto in the review process as a bargaining chip. The more centralized review processes are, the more opportunities member states have to enact such strategies.

Table 3: Institutional Designs and Their Impact on Process Performance

Management Task	Germany Design	Impact on Performance	European Union Design	Impact on Performance
Planning	Incremental	Boots quickly on ground	Synoptic, formal	Slow, re-planning necessary
Organization & Leadership	Decentralized, deregulated	Flexible, adjustable	Centralized, regulated	Slow, unreliable
Review	Regular reporting	No Adjustment	Reporting, strategy reviews	Erratic adjustments

Table 3 summarizes the linkages observed between the design of management tasks and performance. Findings on planning and organization and leadership are straightforward: Incremental planning and decentralization enhance performance while synoptic planning and top-down steering of mandate implementation slow down decision-making and suppress flexible cooperation agreements and local ownership. A street-level model (*Lipsky* 1980) seems to be the superior institutional solution for the implementation of a complex and wicked policy problem such as post-conflict police reform assistance – irrespective of the institutional actor being a domestic or international bureaucracy.

As opposed to this conclusion, findings on the last management task are more ambiguous. The standard model of strategy review and evaluation assumes that strategy adjustments will be made in case policy reviews to detect a severe deviation between strategy and outcome (*Stufflebeam/Shinkfield* 2007). However, despite having regular reporting and evaluation frameworks installed, none of the two cases contained such a link. On the one hand, Germany did not take the required adjustments in 2006 because domestic political leaders at the time still lacked interest in the police assistance work carried out by German police officers and diplomats in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the situation should have been different in the EU, given that member states established the Union's security and defense policy for the very purpose of conducting crisis management operations. However, the EU's multilateral nature, with 27 (now 28) member states, provides just the scenario *Wildavsky* (1972, p. 516) had in mind when he warned that review instruments "may be wielded as a weapon in the political wars". As one EUPOL official said, "[t]he high-level political and economic game of EU member states and related power struggling is always filled up with hidden agendas and bilateral efforts that affect what we do on the ground" (Interview 27). This points to a larger dilemma for peacebuilding carried out by international organizations. In order to fulfill their mandate, peacebuilders need autonomy to perform. Without sufficient distance from member-state negotiations, operative tasks will fall victim to diplomatic package deals. From time to time, however, member states need to be confronted with operative processes in order to provide political support and ensure strategic adjustments when necessary. This bears the risk of politicization and a negative impact on performance.

Conclusion: A Strategic Fit in Police Reform Assistance?

This contribution aimed at scrutinizing whether two peacebuilding organizations exhibit a strategic fit between their policy mandate and the design of management tasks. To assess this fit, the paper compared how differences in management functions affect the process performance of two peace operations. I found that incremental planning, decentralization and autonomous leadership enhance performance as they enable peacebuilders to respond flexibly to the dynamic operative challenges they face in the field. Very much in line with *Matland* (1995), ambiguous and politically controversial policies such as external assistance to police reform should best be implemented based on a bottom-up, street-level model.

By contrast, the present contribution highlights the tension between the peacebuilding bureaucracy's functional need for autonomy and the necessity to ensure policy adjustments based on review and evaluation. None of the two case studies contained a 'strategic fit' in this respect. Irrespective of whether management functions were decentralized or centralized, strategy review failed (Germany) or led to unintended consequences (EUPOL). In particular policy implementation by international organizations seems vulnerable to politicization. As others have argued before me, powerful member states exploit organizational rules to benefit their own political agendas, irrespective of the damage this may cause for implementing certain policies (*Allen/Yuen* 2014; *Seibel* 2012; *Stone* 2011). This paper concludes that evaluation seems to be a critical link when it comes to the implementation of wicked policies. In the EU system, as was demonstrated, review and evaluation created additional opportunities to enact politicization.

Assessing the prevalence of a "strategic fit" between policy objectives and management tasks seems to be a valuable analytical angle to identify bureaucratic frictions that oftentimes hamper policy implementation (*Pressman/Wildavsky* 1973). However, performance assessed against process indicators allowed for zooming in on the activities of implementing agencies, but it also distorted a broader view on the policy's societal effects. It would be worthwhile as a next step to broaden the view by assessing whether and how differences in management tasks also affect policy outcomes. This implies challenging whether EUPOL – after all a civilian mission – in the first place was the right instrument for police support in an increasingly deteriorating security environment.

Notes

- 1 The author thanks the Wipcad team at Potsdam University, in particular Harald Fuhr, and four anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
- 2 See Foreign Office website for more details: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/Abteilungen/S_node.html (accessed 01 February 2016).
- 3 For reasons of brevity, organization and leadership are discussed as one category in this paper.
- 4 Interview transcripts based on author's notes. The author travelled to Afghanistan and approached interviewees in the capacity as an individual researcher without any governmental affiliation.
- 5 Speech by the German Minister of Development Cooperation Heidemarie Wiecezorek-Zeul at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo (21 January 2002). Retrieved from: <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/daparchive/volltext/ anzeige.php?zaehler=522> (accessed 01 November 2015).
- 6 Interviewees testified that this was the maximum amount the German Ministry of Interior was able to extract from the overstretched German police service (Interviews No. 17, 18).

- 7 The provisions on the deployment of German police officers abroad are defined in the Law on the Federal Police (BPolG), see specifically §8 and §65.
- 8 EUPOL's Deputy Head of Mission, Nigel Thomas, later stated on record that his superior had "described the bureaucracy of the system as stifling" and that he had "urged the EU to provide the Head of Mission with the autonomy needed to respond to the rapidly changing circumstances on the ground" (United Kingdom 2011).
- 9 Testimony by Nigel Thomas in a UK parliamentary hearing (United Kingdom 2011).
- 10 Public statement by senior EU official Klees Klompenhower in a United Kingdom parliamentary hearing (United Kingdom 2011).
- 11 See EUPOL website <http://www.eupol-afg.eu/node/394> and <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/documents/news/1.pdf> (both accessed 01 February 2016).
- 12 According to information provided by the BMI upon request (E-Mail dated 11 September 2012).
- 13 According to one police officer with detailed knowledge of processes within the BMI (Interview 22). Interior Minister Schäuble and Foreign Minister Steinmeier even published an op-ed announcing a German staff increase to force the ministry to act. The op-ed was published on 24 February 2008 in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, a copy can be retrieved from Wolfgang Schäuble's personal webpage <http://www.wolfgang-schaeuble.de/index.php?id=36&textid=1121&page=3> (accessed 01 February 2016).

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